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We investigate the approximate quantum state sharing protocol based on random unitary chan-
nels, which is secure against any exterior or interior attackers in principle. Although the protocol
leaks small information for a security parameter ε, the scheme still preserves its information-theoretic
secrecy, and reduces some pre-shared classical secret keys for a private quantum channel between
a sender and two receivers. The approximate private quantum channels constructed via random
unitary channels play a crucial role in the proposed quantum state sharing protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics allows us a perfect randomness, so most of all quantum information-theoretic primitives try to
offer an unconditional security under the randomness. For examples, quantum key distribution protocols such as
BB84 [1] and B92 [2] highly depend on a random measurements for given classified non-orthogonal quantum states.
Instead of the random measurement on non-orthogonal states, we can consider a direct randomization of quantum
states through a quantum channel. This randomizing procedures are efficiently accomplished via the private quantum
channels (PQC) or quantum one-time pads [3]. In the paper we are interest to some schemes for approximate
encryptions (no perfect) and we make an attempt to reducing some classical communication resources. We would
like to call the randomizing procedures or maps as random unitary channels (RUC) in terms of quantum channels.
There are several methods for the approximate randomizing quantum states, for examples, [4, 5, 8]: We here adapt
the procedure of Hayden et al. [4].
Many applications of RUC in quantum protocols (See e.g., [4, 6, 7].) are started from the approximate version of
PQC. Here we will propose new approximate quantum state sharing (AQSS) scheme, which uses two approximate
PQCs (APQC) and reduces the classical pre-shared secrets about one-half as compared with a perfect protocol.
Actually our protocol could be including the (well-known) quantum secret sharing protocols [9, 10], because a quantum
state itself is able to operate special quantum tasks, though those are impossible in the classical power. Imagine that
if there is a quantum computer only activated under a bipartite quantum state (or quantum key), then our AQSS
protocol will give a efficient and secure solution for the quantum key. These approximate quantum state sharing
protocols may offer us more opportunities as compared with the quantum secret sharing.
Let’s take account of the pre-shared secrets for the approximate quantum state sharing protocols under RUC-based
PQC roughly. Assume that a sender Charlie prepares a quantum state ϕAB (two-qudit) and transmits the state
through two independent RUCs, then two distant agents Alice and Bob will receive some output state of including
high entropy. For the state ϕAB the perfect randomization protocol will require exactly the amount of 4 log d-unitary
matrices (Pauli matrices). On the other hand, the construction of Hayden et al. [4] for our AQSS scheme implies that
only 2 log d+ o(log d)-unitaries sufficient. In other words, the perfect quantum state sharing protocol needs to 2l bits
of pre-shared secret information, while the AQSS protocol demands about l bits of information. Note that the works
in [5, 8] will give a similar result for l bits bound.
We will prove the information-theoretic security of the AQSS scheme in two kinds of eavesdropping: an interior
and exterior attackers. The proof of having higher entropy condition for the exterior attacks is not easy fact, so we
split the input state ϕAB to separable and entangled cases. As a result, the von Neumann entropy in both cases can
be chosen sufficiently larger, and a leakage information will be arbitrarily small. Finally the authors show that our
bipartite AQSS scheme naturally can be generalized to an one-sender and multiparty-receivers schemes.
In section II we introduce the definition of random unitary channels, and briefly mention about special property
known as the destruction of quantum states on a product random unitary channel. We present our AQSS protocol
based on two approximate PQCs in section III, and investigate the security of AQSS of considering two attacks: an
exterior and interior strategies. we finally conclude our results in section IV.
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FIG. 1: Approximate private quantum channel: Alice applies some Ui’s and Bob decodes N (ϕ) with i of having pre-shared
log n bits classical information.
II. SOME PROPERTIES OF RANDOM UNITARY CHANNELS
Now let us define the random unitary channel, and then construct an approximate private quantum channels. For
all density matrices ϕ ∈ B(Cd), a completely positive trace-preserving map N : B(Cd) → B(Cd) is the so-called
ε-randomizing, if ∥∥∥∥N (ϕ)− 1d
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε, (1)
where the trace norm is defined by ‖X‖1 =
√
X†X. This definition directly induces the notion of random unitary
channels. That is, for every ϕ, a quantum channel N : B(Cd)→ B(Cd) is called the random unitary channel, if
N (ϕ) =
n∑
i=1
piUiϕU
†
i (2)
is ε-randomizing, where the unitary operators Ui ∈ U(d), and the probability pi’s are all positives with
∑
i pi = 1.
(The notation B(Cd) denotes the set of bounded linear operators from Cd to itself and U(d) ⊂ B(Cd) the unitary
group on Cd.) Note that the parameter n is the number of Kraus operation elements for RUC, so it corresponds to
the dimension of arbitrary environment.
For the approximate constructions of RUC, it was known that for all ε > 0 there exist random unitary channels in
sufficiently larger dimension d, such that n can be taken to be O(d log d/ε2) in [4] and O(d/ε2) in [12] where Ui’s are
chosen randomly according to the Haar measure. We here fix the number n of having exactly n = 150d
ε2
, the Theorem
1 in [12].
As mentioned in the Introduction, most intuitive application of the random unitary channel is the approximate
private quantum channel [4], which is a modification of the perfect private quantum channel [3] via RUC. The RUC-
based APQC is the main tool of constructing the proposed AQSS protocol.
The security of PQC is preserved by the argument of the accessible information in which the leakage information is
less than ε. Although small information is leaked to exterior attackers, Bob’s decoding state is almost equal to Alice’s
original state ϕ. The FIG. 1 describes the total procedure of APQC.
In the next section we use two one-way independent PQCs between a sender Charlie and a receiver Alice, and the
sender Charlie and another receiver Bob. Let’s define two RUCs, from the definition of (Eq. (2)), such that
NA(ϕ) : = 1
nA
nA∑
i=1
UiϕU
†
i and
(3)
NB(ϕ) : = 1
nB
nB∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j ,
where we fix the probability as an equally weighted probabilities pi =
1
nA
and pj =
1
nB
for all i, j, and assume that the
number of nA is equal to nB, i.e., nA = nB = 150d/ε
2. For an approximate state sharing of any bipartite quantum
state, above two channels play an important role in the approximate quantum state sharing scheme.
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FIG. 2: Approximate QSS: If Charlie-Alice and Charlie-Bob have shared two independent PQCs each other, then the product
channel NA ⊗NB preserves the security with high probability for any attacks. The arrow denotes that Alice must go to Bob’s
location to obtain the state.
For given two RUCs NA and NB , and for all input ϕAB , we must bound the trace norm for the difference between
an output state of the product channel NA ⊗NB and maximally mixed 1/d2, such that∥∥∥∥(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)− 1A ⊗ 1Bd2
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε, (4)
where a security parameter ε be a positive less than 1. The relation above asserts that all encoding states are
information-theoretically secure. Unfortunately, for any entangled states proving the bound is not a simple task.
Note that the argument for the (efficient) randomization is related to a destruction of correlations in quantum
states [4, 11]. They pointed out that the unitary operations of the amount corresponding to the quantum mutual
information I[A : B] = S[ϕA] + S[ϕB] − S[ϕAB ] efficiently destroy the total correlation of any quantum states [11],
where S[̺] = −tr̺ log ̺ the von Neumann entropy. For the maximally entangled state ϕAB = 1d
∑
i,j |ii〉〈jj|AB,
I[A : B] = 2 log d, which might be related to the Eq. (5).
The following section gives the AQSS protocol and the security of the protocol. The last of the section, we briefly
describe a multiparty AQSS scheme.
III. APPROXIMATE QUANTUM STATE SHARING PROTOCOL
Let us assume that Charlie-Alice and Charlie-Bob have independent two APQCs, and Charlie wants to sharing a
bipartite quantum state ϕAB securely between Alice and Bob.
The protocol for a bipartite quantum state sharing is simple (See FIG. 2):
(i) The sender Charlie selects a quantum state ϕAB and transmits the state through the channel NA ⊗NB to the
receivers Alice and Bob.
(ii) Distant two parties Alice and Bob just hold the state NA ⊗NB(ϕAB) they received.
(iii) When Alice and Bob want to reveal the original state ϕAB, they must cooperate in a single location. They
perform the inverse unitary operations under the locally shared keys.
The security of the AQSS protocol is divided two cases of an exterior and interior attacks. Actually the security
is based on information-theoretic assumption, which means that the intercepted states must have the higher von
Neumann entropy. Thus any attackers cannot obtain sufficient information for the original states.
First, let us consider an attack accomplished by an exterior Eve. Assume that Eve intercepts the state NA ⊗
NB(ϕAB). We here claim that
S[(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)] ∼ 2 log d→∞ (5)
as d goes to infinity. We don’t know the accurate description for the state NA ⊗NB(ϕAB) for all inputs, so we will
divide the state ϕAB into the separable and entangled one and investigate the behavior each other.
If product state is given, it is possible to infer the inequality Eq. (4) easily. By using the triangle inequal-
ity with respect to the trace norm for the two RUCs, if
∥∥NA(ϕA)− 1Ad ∥∥1 ≤ ε and ∥∥NB(ϕB)− 1Bd ∥∥1 ≤ ε, then
4∥∥(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)− 1ABd2 ∥∥1 ≤ 2ε for ϕAB = ϕA⊗ϕB . More formally assume that ϕAB =∑i piϕA,i⊗ϕB,i such that∑
i pi = 1, i.e., a separable state is given, then∥∥∥∥(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)− 1ABd2
∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
piNA(ϕA,i)⊗NB(ϕB,i)− 1AB
d2
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∑
i
pi
∥∥∥∥NA(ϕA,i)⊗NB(ϕB,i)− 1ABd2
∥∥∥∥
1
(6)
=
∑
i
pi
∥∥∥∥NA(ϕA,i)⊗NB(ϕB,i)−NA(ϕA,i)⊗ 1Bd +NA(ϕA,i)⊗ 1Bd − 1ABd2
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∑
i
pi
[∥∥∥∥NA(ϕA,i)− 1Ad2
∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥NB(ϕB,i)− 1Bd2
∥∥∥∥
1
]
(7)
≤ 2ε,
where the inequalities Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) come from the norm convexity and the triangle inequality, respectively [4].
Thus any separable inputs for the product channel are very close to the maximally mixed state 1
d2
. This implies that
S[(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)] is close to 2 log d.
For the separable input cases, there is another bound that depends on the dimension parameter d and n: We can
prove that the expectation value for the difference between the channel output and the maximally mixed state (with
respect to the trace norm) is very close, that is,
E{Ui,j}
∥∥∥∥(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)− 1d2
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
d2
nAnB
, (8)
where E{Ui,j} denotes the total expectation value of {Ui}nAi=1 and {Uj}nBj=1 for the independent RUCs NA and NB,
respectively. The Appendix in this paper states that the inequality Eq. (8) is non-trivial and obtained precisely
by exploiting the relation between the trace norm and the Hilbert-Schmidt norm. As mentioned above, let’s take
nA =
150d
ε2
and nB =
150d
ε2
, then
d√
nAnB
=
ε2
150
< ε. (9)
This implies that Eve’s attack is impossible in principle.
What can we do for an entangled input state? Though a direct proof could be impossible, there is an evidence for
the statement, the Eq. (5). The Theorem III.3 in [4] states that, for a positive operator-valued measure (POVM)
{Li} which is implemented using local operation and classical communication (LOCC),
∑
i ‖pi − qi‖1 ≤ ε, where
pi := tr(Li(NA⊗1B)(ϕAB)) and qi := tr(Li(1Ad ⊗ϕB)) with a maximally entangled state s.t. ϕAB = 1d
∑d
i,j |ii〉〈jj|AB
and ϕB = trAϕAB . Natural extension is possible as adding the channel NB: Define pi = tr(Li(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)) and
qi = tr(Li(
1AB
d2
)), then also
∑
i ‖pi − qi‖1 ≤ ε. Therefore, we can conclude the state NA ⊗ NB(ϕAB) is close to 1d2
under the LOCC-implemented POVM. In this reason any input state ϕAB through the product channel NA ⊗ NB
have high entropy for d≫ 1.
Second, we must consider a situation when Alice or Bob is malicious. Assume that Bob intercepts the Alice’s state
NA(ϕA), Bob’s decoded state looks like
(NA ⊗N ∗B)(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB) = (NA ⊗ 1B)(ϕAB), (10)
where ∗ denotes the inverse operation for Bob’s RUCNB , but S[NA(ϕA)] has still high entropy values. The intercepted
state trB(NA ⊗ 1B)(ϕAB) is still almost maximally mixed state by the definition of the RUC NA(ϕA). As a result,
Bob cannot obtain any information for ϕA without Charlie-Alice’s key information. Symmetrically Alice’s attack is
useless. In other words, the Charlie’s aim of sharing a quantum state ϕAB between Alice and Bob will be securely
accomplished.
At least above-mentioned two attacks (exterior and interior eavesdropping) cannot break the security of the proposed
AQSS protocol. so the cooperation between Alice and Bob always restores the original state approximately.
In the proposed scenarios, the perfect protocol for quantum state sharing requires exactly d4 unitary operators,
while our protocol only needs to total 22500d2/ε4 unitaries for sufficiently larger d. This fact directly means that
some pre-shared key bits are reduced by factor 2, since the AQSS is needed 2 log d− 4 log ε+O(1) secret bits, but the
5perfect QSS is required 4 log d bits. For any state ϕAB ∈ B(Cd2), and for any channel NAB (for an ε > 0 is arbitrary),
let’s consider a relation like that ∥∥∥∥NAB(ϕAB)− 1d2
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε. (11)
Then, it is sufficient to construct the perfect QSS (ε = 0) with d4 Pauli operators for the channel NAB in the sense of
PQC [4, 8]. In the case of our approximate QSS, the product channel of two RUCs (NAB = NA ⊗NB) just consume
of half secret bits, so we say that it is efficient in weak sense (though small information is always leaking).
Without loss of generality, a direct extension of the bipartite quantum state sharing protocol (Eq. (8)) gives the
security of a multiparty approximate quantum state sharing (MAQSS). Assume that a sender Charlie (C) prepares
an m-qudit ϕA1A2···Am . If they initially have shared PQCs between C-A1, C-A2 and so on, then, for any ε > 0,∥∥∥∥(NA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ NAm)(ϕA1A2···Am)− 1dm
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε. (12)
The above Eq. (12) implies that any exterior attacks will be failed. Furthermore all interior attacks (including group
conspiracy) will be frustrated to obtain the whole state without others secrets, it has similar reason to the two receivers
protocol. Let’s look at the cost of secret bits for the MAQSS scheme. Roughly speaking, the perfect scheme requires
2m log d secret bits, but MAQSS only m log d+ o(log d)-bits sufficient.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We studied that the approximate quantum state sharing schemes are efficient from the classical information cost
of view and those are robust to the two kinds of attacks. The proposed AQSS protocol basically depends on an
approximate private quantum channel, which is constructed via two independent random unitary channels. Although
the protocol leaks small information corresponding to the security parameter ε, the scheme preserves its information-
theoretic security, and so the AQSS and MAQSS schemes can be interpreted as some high-efficiency state sharing
protocols for any bipartite and multipartite quantum states.
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Appendix
For given two random unitary channelsNA(ϕ) andNB(ϕ) in Eq. (3), and for all pure-separable states ϕAB ∈ B(Cd2),
‖(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)‖22 = tr(NA ⊗NB)2(ϕAB)
=
1
n2An
2
B
nA∑
i=1
nB∑
j=1
tr
(
Ui ⊗ UjϕABU †i ⊗ U †j
)2
+
1
n2An
2
B
nA∑
i6=k
nB∑
j 6=l
tr
(
Ui ⊗ UjϕABU †i ⊗ U †j
)(
Uk ⊗ UlϕABU †k ⊗ U †l
)
, (13)
where tr
(
Ui ⊗ UjϕABU †i ⊗ U †j
)2
= 1 for any pure states ϕAB. (Note that this method is just an extension of the
statement, the chapter 3 in [8].)
Recall that the unitary operators are chosen randomly according to the Haar measure, and take expectation over
6the random selection of unitaries:
E{Ui,j}
[
tr(NA ⊗NB)2(ϕAB)
]
=
1
nAnB
+
1
n2An
2
B
∑
i6=k
∑
j 6=l
E{Ui,j}tr
(
Ui ⊗ UjϕABU †i ⊗ U †j
)(
Uk ⊗ UlϕABU †k ⊗ U †l
)
=
1
nAnB
+ tr
[
E{Ui,j}
(
Ui ⊗ UjϕABU †i ⊗ U †j
)
E{Uk,l}
(
Uk ⊗ UlϕABU †k ⊗ U †l
)]
(14)
=
1
nAnB
+ tr
1
d4
(15)
=
1
nAnB
+
1
d2
. (16)
In Eq. (14), we have used that Ui,j and Uk,l are chosen independently, and Eq. (15) inherited from the definition of the
Haar measure. (For any ϕ ∈ B(Cd), a Haar-distributed set U := {Ui}ni=1 satisfies that EUUϕU † =
∫
UϕU †dU = 1
d
.)
The Eq. (15) exploits the separable condition for ϕAB . Note that for any rank d matrix X ‖X‖1 ≤
√
d‖X‖2. For any
rank d2 matrix X , a generalization of the Corollary A.2 in [8] directly show that
∥∥∥∥X − 1A ⊗ 1Bd2
∥∥∥∥
2
1
≤ d2‖X‖22 − 1. (17)
Then, from considering the random variable Y :=
∥∥(NA ⊗NB)(ϕAB)− 1d2∥∥1 and Eq. (16),
EY ≤
√
EY 2
≤
√
d2‖Y ‖2
2
− 1 (18)
=
√
d2
nAnB
.
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